ABSTRACT In this paper, we study physical-layer security for a spectrum-sharing heterogeneous cellular network consisting of a macro cell and an underlaying small cell, where a small base station (SBS) and a macro base station (MBS) transmit to their respective small user (SU) and macro user (MU) over their shared spectrum. A common eavesdropper is assumed to tap both the small-cell and macro-cell transmissions. In the macro cell, multiple distributed antennas of MBS are deployed around the far-off MU and only a single antenna is selected to transmit to MU. Meanwhile, SBS directly transmits to SU in the small cell. To improve the spectrum efficiency, we consider underlay spectrum sharing (USS), which allows SBS and MBS to simultaneously access the shared spectrum. We present two USS schemes, namely, the interferencecancelled opportunistic antenna selection (IC-OAS) and interference-limited opportunistic antenna selection (IL-OAS), where a sophisticatedly-designed signal is exploited in the IC-OAS to perfectly cancel out the interference received at MU from SBS. Closed-form expressions of the secrecy outage probability are derived for both the IC-OAS and IL-OAS schemes over Rayleigh fading channels. Numerical results show that the IC-OAS scheme significantly performs better than the IL-OAS scheme for the macro-cell transmission in terms of the secrecy outage probability. Moreover, with an increasing number of distributed antennas, the secrecy outage probabilities of both IC-OAS and IL-OAS decrease substantially.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to an explosive growth of wireless devices, the amount of wireless data traffic is expected to increase 1000 times in the future decade [1] - [3] . In order to meet this challenge, wireless network operators are encouraged to boost the capacity of their cellular systems. Typically, the conventional macro-cell network architecture is designed to provide basic coverage and could not deal with the aforementioned challenge of overwhelming growth in data traffic. Consequently, heterogeneous cellular networks are considered as a promising way to expand network coverage and improve system capacity [4] - [6] , which are usually composed of traditional macro base stations (MBS) and emerging small base stations (SBS) (e.g., pico base stations and femto base stations), relay base stations, and distributed antennas, where the small cells with smaller coverage are densely deployed over the macro cells with wider coverage [7] . Thus, spectrum efficiency is significantly improved by allowing the small cells and macro cells to share the same spectrum [3] , [8] . However, it may lead to the existence of mutual interference among the small cells and macro cells, since the same spectrum resource is simultaneously used in an underlay fashion. For the sake of mitigating the adverse effect of mutual interference, an interference-aware scheme was proposed in [9] to limit the interference level under an acceptable level. Microscopic and macroscopic interference control schemes were studied in [10] for the purpose of alleviating intercell interference for heterogeneous cellular networks. In [11] - [13] , interference management was explored to expand the network coverage and enhance the system throughput for heterogeneous cellular networks.
Meanwhile, because of the broadcast nature of wireless propagation [14] and the open architecture of heterogeneous cellular networks [15] , confidential messages transmitted to intended users are extremely vulnerable to be attacked by malicious eavesdroppers. Consequently, it is necessary to investigate the transmission confidentiality in heterogeneous cellular networks against eavesdropping attacks. The conventional cryptographic techniques were employed for solving the transmission security issue at the cost of extra computation and latency. Moreover, the eavesdropper may decrypt the encrypted information with powerful computation capacity. As a supplement of cryptographic techniques, physicallayer security has been emerging as an effective means to strengthen wireless transmission security by making full use of physical characteristics of wireless media, since the first physical-layer security research was carried out by Wyner in [16] , where the notion of secrecy capacity is shown as the difference between the capacity of legitimate channel and that of wiretap channel. Recently, cooperative relay [17] - [19] , artificial noise [20] - [22] , and beamforming [23] - [25] were proposed to strengthen the physical-layer security for different wireless network scenarios.
To the best of our knowledge, the vast majority of existing research efforts on heterogeneous cellular networks are concentrated on the system modeling, performance analysis and optimization in terms of network coverage [26] , [27] , spectrum efficiency [28] , [29] and energy efficiency [30] , [31] , and few attention has been paid to physical-layer security for heterogeneous cellular networks [32] - [34] . Recently, mutual interference between the small cell and macro cell was exploited intelligently in [1] to defend against eavesdropping for a spectrum-sharing heterogeneous cellular network, where an interferencecancelled underlay spectrum sharing (IC-USS) scheme was proposed for cancelling out the interference received at an intended user and severely interfering with an undesired eavesdropper.
Inspired by [1] , where a system model with a single antenna was studied and its closed-form expressions of outage probability and intercept probability were derived, separately, in this paper, we investigate physical-layer security for distributed antenna systems [35] , [36] in heterogeneous cellular networks, where multiple antennas of MBS are distributed around the edge of macro cell for improving the quality-of-service of far-off users. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows. First, based on the distributed antenna system as shown in Fig. 1 , we have first combined the interference cancellation (IC) technique in [1] and opportunistic antenna selection (OAS) mechanism and proposed IC-OAS scheme for the sake of improving the secrecy outage performance of heterogeneous cellular networks. Second, we derive closed-form expressions of secrecy outage probability for the IC-OAS and interferencelimited opportunistic antenna selection (IL-OAS) schemes over Rayleigh fading channels, where both the small-cell and macro-cell transmissions are taken into account. Third, numerical results show that the IC-OAS scheme significantly outperforms the IL-OAS scheme for the macro-cell transmission from the secrecy outage perspective. Moreover, the secrecy outage probability of the macro-cell transmission can be further optimized by adjusting a ratio of the signal-tonoise ratio (SNR) of small cell to that of macro cell.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the system model of a spectrumsharing heterogeneous cellular network and propose the IL-OAS and IC-OAS schemes. In Section III, we carry out secrecy outage analysis for both IL-OAS and IC-OAS schemes over Rayleigh fading channels. Then, numerical results are given in Section IV. Finally, Section V provides some concluding remarks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first describe the system model of a heterogeneous cellular network, where a small cell is deployed on a macro cell in the presence of a passive eavesdropper (E), which intends to overhear the legitimate transmissions of both samll cell and macro cell. In the macro cell, MBS first sends its confidential messages x M to distributed antenna A i (i = 1, 2, · · · , N ) through fibers, where N is the total number of distributed antennas. Then, an antenna is selected to transmit x M to a macro user (MU). Meanwhile, in the small cell, the SBS transmits its confidential messages x S to a small user (SU) over the same spectrum resource used by MBS. Besides, an undesired eavesdropper is available to overhear both A i -MU and SBS-SU transmissions. Remarkably, MBS and SBS are connected with a core network through fiberoptic cables, which enables the real-time communications between MBS and SBS.
Although only a single small cell and a single macro cell are taken into account in this paper, a possible extension can be considered for a large-scale heterogeneous network consisting of multiple macro and small cells with the help of stochastic geometry [37] and user scheduling [38] . It needs to be pointed out that the complex Gaussian noise with a zero mean and a variance of N 0 is assumed to be encountered at any receiver in Fig. 1 .
In this paper, we consider USS mechanism for improving the utilization of spectrum resource. The emphasis of this paper is to analyze the secrecy outage performance for both IL-OAS and IC-OAS schemes over Rayleigh fading channels.
A. IL-OAS SCHEME
In this subsection, we characterize the traditional IL-OAS scheme, where the transmit power of SBS should be limited below a tolerable level to guarantee the quality of service of MU. First, Let P M and P S separately denote the transmit power of x M and x S . Assuming that A represents the antenna selected, the corresponding capacity of A-MU and SBS-SU transmissions can be obtained as
and separately denote the SNRs of MBS and SBS. Typically, the antenna maximizes the capacity of A i -MU will be selected. Hence, an opportunistic antenna selection criterion is further obtained as
where
Meanwhile, the passive eavesdropper may tap both A-MU and SBS-SU transmissions. For convenience of calculation, we here assume that the eavesdropper separately decodes x M and x S without considering successive interference cancelation mechanism [1] . Thus, the capacity of A-E and SBS-E transmissions are given as
and
where h Ae and h Se separately represent fading coefficients of A-E and SBS-E transmission.
B. IC-OAS SCHEME
In this subsection, we characterize the IC-OAS scheme, where a special signal denoted by x m is sophisticatedly designed and emitted at MBS for perfectly canceling out the interference received at MU. For the sake of fairness, the total transmit power of x M and x m is set at P M . Letting P m represent the transmit power of x m , the transmit power of x M is P M −P m (P M > P m ). As a result, the received signal at MU can be obtained as
where n m is the complex Gaussian noise at MU, the channel state information of h Am and h Sm may be obtained by channel estimation methods, and x S and P S can be obtained at the MBS in real time through the core network. Consequently, the specially-designed signal x m can be designed as
which ensures that the interference can be completely cancelled out. From (7), P m is given by
where σ 2 Sm and σ 2 Am are the means of |h Sm | 2 and |h Am | 2 , respectively. Thus, the received signal at MU is simplified as
Meanwhile, the received signal at SU is expressed as
where n s is the complex Gaussian noise at SU. Hence, the corresponding capacity of A-MU and SBS-SU VOLUME 6, 2018
transmissions can be obtained as
Similarly, the antenna maximizes the capacity of A i -MU channel will be selected. Consequently, an opportunistic antenna selection criterion of IC-OAS is further obtained as
Meanwhile, the passive eavesdropper may tap both A-MU and SBS-SU transmissions. Consequently, the received signal at E is obtained as (14) where n e is the complex Gaussian noise encountered at E. Similarly, the capacity of A-E and SBS-E transmissions are given as
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we characterize secrecy outage performance for both IL-OAS and IC-OAS schemes by deriving closed-form expressions of their secrecy outage probability. As discussed in [16] and [39] , when the secrecy capacity is below a given secrecy rate, a secrecy outage event will occur. Thus, letting C s and R s respectively denote the secrecy capacity and secrecy rate, the probability of a secrecy outage event (referred to as secrecy outage probability) can be formulated as
A. IL-OAS SCHEME
In this subsection, we analyze the secrecy outage performance of the small-cell and macro-cell transmissions based on IL-OAS scheme. We first obtain the secrecy capacity of A-MU and SBS-SU transmissions as
Ss and C IL-OAS
Se are respectively given by (1), (4), (2) and (5). Using (17) and (18), (17) and (28) .
the secrecy outage probability of macro-cell transmission for IL-OAS can be obtained as
where R s M is the secrecy rate of MBS' transmission. Substi-
from (18) into (20) and using total probability formula yields
Assuming that in the high SNR region, (21) can be approximately expressed as
which is called the asymptotic secrecy outage probability. Proceeding as in Appendix A, P IL-OAS s-out,M of (22) Table 1 .
Similarly, using (17) and (19) , the secrecy outage probability of small-cell transmission can be obtained as 
where R s S is the secrecy rate of SBS' transmission.
from (19) into (24) yields
where s S = 2 R s S . Similarly, assuming that in the high SNR region, (28) can be approximately expressed as × Pr
.
Proceeding as in Appendix B, the term P IL-OAS s-out,S1 in (27) is calculated as (28) at the next page, and the term P IL-OAS
s-out,S2
in (27) is calculated as
where random variables h A i m 2 (i = 1, 2, · · · , N ) are assumed to be identically distributed and other parameters can be found in Table 1 .
B. IC-OAS
This subsection presents the secrecy outage probability analysis for IC-OAS scheme. Again, we first obtain the capacity of A-MU and SBS-SU transmissions of IC-OAS scheme as
Ss
and C IC-OAS Se are respectively given by (11) , (15), (12) and (16) . Using (17) and (30), the secrecy outage probability of macro-cell transmission for IC-OAS can be obtained as
Substituting C IC-OAS s,M from (30) into (32) and using total probability formula yield
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Proceeding as in Appendix C, P IC-OAS s-out,M of (34) can be obtained as (35) Table 2 .
Similarly, using (17) and (31), the secrecy outage probability of small-cell transmission can be given by
Substituting C IC-OAS s,S from (31) into (36) yields
where s S = 2 R s S . Again, assuming that in the high SNR region, (37) can be approximately expressed as 
The term P IC-OAS s-out,S1 in (39) is identical to P IL-OAS s-out,S1 of (28). Similar to Appendix C, the term P IC-OAS S-out,S2 in (39) can be readily calculated as (40) at the top of next page, where f X (x) and f X A k (x A k ) are the probability density functions (PDFs)
and max
respectively.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present the numerical results for IC-OAS and IL-OAS schemes in terms of their secrecy outage probability with the consideration of macro-cell transmission and small-cell transmission, separately. Without loss of generality, let β = γ S /γ M denote a ratio of the SNR of the small cell to that of the macro cell, namely the small-to-macro ratio (SMR). In our numerical evaluation, the variances of legitimate channels, interference channels and wiretap channels are specified as σ 2
Ss = 10 and σ 2 Sm = 5, respectively. Additionally, N = 4, γ M = 15dB, R s M = R s S = 1bit/s/Hz, and β = 0.1 are assumed, unless otherwise noted.
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In Fig. 2 , we present the secrecy outage probability versus SNR γ M of the IC-OAS, IL-OAS and IC-USS schemes for the macro-cell transmission, where both the simulated exact secrecy outage probability and derived asymptotic outage probability are given. To be specific, simulated exact secrecy outage probability curves of Fig. 2 are plotted by using (21) and (33) and reffering to (24) and (26) in [1] , while asymptotic secrecy outage probability results are obtained from (23) and (35) . One can observe from Fig. 2 that with an increasing SNR, the exact and asymptotic secrecy outage probabilities converge to each other for both the IC-OAS and IL-OAS schemes, verifying the effectiveness and correctness of our asymptotic secrecy outage analysis for the macro-cell transmission. Moreover, as the SNR increases, the asymptotic secrecy outage result of IL-OAS scheme remains constant. By contrast, the asymptotic secrecy outage probability of IC-OAS continuously decreases with an increasing SNR, showing the advantage of our IC-OAS scheme over IL-OAS scheme in terms of their secrecy outage probability for the macro-cell transmission. Moreover, as the number of distributed antennas N increases from 4 to 6, the secrecy outage probabilities of both the IL-OAS and IC-OAS schemes decrease, meaning the secrecy outage improvement achieved by increasing the number of distributed antennas. Additionally, from the simulation results of Fig. 2 , the secrecy outage performance of the IC-OAS scheme always outperforms the IC-USS scheme for the macro-cell transmission. VOLUME 6, 2018 Fig. 3 that for both the IL-OAS, IC-OAS and IC-USS schemes, the increase of secrecy rate leads to a secrecy performance degradation, which demonstrates a tradeoff between the secrecy outage and secrecy throughput for heterogeneous cellular networks. Additionally, one can observe from Fig. 3 that the secrecy outage probability of the IC-OAS scheme is always better than that of the IL-OAS and the IC-USS schemes for the macro-cell transmission. Fig. 4 shows the secrecy outage probability comparison among the IC-OAS, IL-OAS and IC-USS schemes by plotting the secrecy outage probability as a function of SMR β. It needs to be pointed out that the SMR β should satisfy an inequality of β ≤ σ 2 A i m /σ 2 Sm for completely canceling out the mutual interference received at MU. As shown in Fig. 4 , the secrecy outage probability of the IL-OAS scheme almost remains unchanged with an increase of β. Meanwhile, the secrecy outage probabilities of the IC-OAS and IC-USS schemes decrease first and then increase with the SMR β. This means that the secrecy outage performance of the IC-USS and the proposed IC-OAS schemes could be further optimized by adjusting the SMR β for the macro-cell transmission.
In Fig. 5 , we present the secrecy outage probability versus SNR γ M of the IC-OAS, IL-OAS and IC-USS schemes for the small-cell transmission, where both the simulated exact secrecy outage probability and derived asymptotic outage probability are given. To be specific, simulated exact secrecy outage probability curves of Fig. 5 are plotted by using (25) and (37) and reffering to (25) and (27) in [1] , while asymptotic secrecy outage probability results are obtained from (27) and (39) . One can observe from Fig.5 that with an increasing SNR, the exact and asymptotic secrecy outage probabilities converge to each other for both the IC-OAS and IL-OAS schemes, verifying the effectiveness and correctness of our asymptotic secrecy outage analysis for the small-cell transmission. Moreover, the secrecy outage results of IC-OAS scheme and that of IL-OAS and IC-USS scheme almost coincide with each other, showing that the proposed IC and OAS mechanisms would not degrade the secrecy outage performance of the small-cell transmission.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated an opportunistic antenna selection (OAS) mechanism for strengthening physical-layer security of an underlay spectrum-sharing heterogeneous cellular network. We derived the closed-form expressions of secrecy outage probability for the IC-OAS and IL-OAS schemes over Rayleigh fading channels. Numerical results illustrated that the proposed IC-OAS scheme always outperforms the IL-OAS scheme in terms of their secrecy outage probability for the macro-cell transmission. Moreover, the secrecy outage performance of the IC-OAS scheme improves significantly, as the number of distributed antennas increases. In addition, the secrecy outage probability of the IC-OAS scheme can be further minimized through an optimization of SMR.
APPENDIX A DERIVATION OF (23)
For convenience, we have the following notations
γ S |h Se | 2 , and
Thus, P IL-OAS
s-out,M from (21) can be rewritten as P 
and f Z (z) separately denote the PDFs of X , Y and Z yields
Thus, P IL-OAS s-out,M is further given at the top of following page. The terms P IL-OAS s-out,M 1 and P IL-OAS s-out,M 2 of (A.2) are separately calculated as (A.3) and (A.4) at next page, and where the parameters are specified in Table 1 
APPENDIX B DERIVATION OF (28) AND (29)
First, we have the following notions
|h Sm | 2 , and
The PDFs of X , Y , Z and Z A k are respectively denoted by f X (x), f Y (y), f Z (z) and f Z A k z A k . Thus, the term P IL-OAS s-out,S1
of (27) can be expressed as
where f X (x) and f Y (y) are given by
respectively. As a consequent, P IL-OAS s-out,S1 is further given by
where the parameters can be found in Table 1 . For the case of g IL
A i
c IL
Meanwhile, for the case of g IL
(B.4)
Combining (B.3) and (B.4), P IL-OAS S-out,S1 of (28) is obtained. Similarly, f Z (z) is given by
Meanwhile, the CDF of Z A k is obtained as
where random variables |h A i m | 2 (i = 1, 2, · · · , N ) are assumed to be identically distributed, again. Hence, the term P IL-OAS s-out,S2 of (27) can be calculated as
where A(j) represents the j-th non-empty subset of '' − {A i }''.
APPENDIX C DERIVATION OF (36)
For national convenience, we have the following notations
and and f Y (y) (shown at the top of the previous page). Thus, P IC-OAS s-out,M is further obtained as (C.2) at the previous page, where the parameters can be obtained in Table 2 . The terms P IC-OAS s-out,M 1 and P IC-OAS s-out,M 2 of (C.2) are separately calculated as (C.3) and (C.4), as shown at the top of the pervious page.
